Peace-keeper: HMS Vanguard arrives back at HMS Naval Base Clyde, Faslane, after a patrol
In the run-up to the general election, one topic at the heart of national security is likely to get lost in the fog of bickering and petty political shenanigans. That is whether the UK should continue to develop a successor to the country’s Trident-armed fleet of Vanguard-class submarines, to maintain an unbroken nuclear deterrent patrol.
While both the Conservative and Labour parties are broadly committed to maintaining a continuous-at-sea deterrent (CASD), the Liberal Democrats are open to the procurement of fewer boats or a different technology altogether. A final decision on the way forward will be rubber-stamped after the election, with ‘main gate’ expected to be approved in 2016. But a lot of drama will be played out before that go-ahead is reached.
The debate over nuclear weapons is wrapped up in security and affordability concerns, and even philosophical reasoning. Why would the UK ditch the deterrent that has helped to deliver peace for 50 years? But what is the role of such a deterrent in an era of asymmetrical warfare, with the threat of terrorists such as ISIL? And can the UK afford a programme that, when lifetime costs are built in, comes with a price-tag of up to £100 billion? These are all questions for which politicians must provide answers, and soon.
It’s an emotive issue, admits Malcolm Chalmers, director of research and defence policy at the Royal United Services Institute, which recently published a detailed report on Trident’s successor. “This decision is about buying a system that will come into service around 2030, and we don’t know what world we will be in then.
“We will probably have countries that will still have nuclear weapons. Not all those countries might be friendly to the UK. We’ve had nuclear weapons since the 1950s and never used them, and hopefully that will remain the case for the next 50 years. But you can’t rule out a confrontation between the UK and another state with nuclear weapons,” he says.
“Whether it’s worth spending the money that we are spending for that scenario – there’s a legitimate judgement to be made. But nuclear weapons are not irrelevant to international security. We are not in a nuclear-free continent, as you can see with Russia. It would be a radical step for the UK to say ‘we want out of this business’.”
The emergence of asymmetric warfare has changed the debate on nuclear weapons, Chalmers admits. “With sub-conventional or terrorist threats, nuclear weapons are irrelevant. Nuclear weapons were irrelevant in Afghanistan and Iraq, and they are irrelevant against ISIL today. But it’s not so clear that they are irrelevant against Russia. The paradox with nuclear weapons is that they make major powers more cautious in risking war, but also make the consequences of such a war much greater.”
So what does the UK’s Trident system, providing CASD, comprise? According to a recent House of Commons Library update on the Trident Successor programme, there are essentially three parts: nuclear warheads, which are mounted on Trident II D5 ballistic missiles, which are launched from Vanguard-class, nuclear-powered submarines. The four submarines in the fleet maintain CASD, with one always out on patrol, on Operation Relentless.
The Vanguard submarines are classed as ship submersible ballistic nuclear (SSBN) vessels. The nuclear deterrent is based at HM Naval Base Clyde at Faslane, Scotland, and the warheads stored at the Royal Naval Armaments Depot, Coulport. Warheads are transported to the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston, Berkshire, for maintenance and overhaul. The missiles are maintained and stored, under agreement with the US, at King’s Bay, Georgia.
The life of the Vanguard-class submarines has been extended, and replacement submarines, known as the Successor programme, are expected to enter service in 2028. The current warheads will remain viable until the late 2030s and the decision on a replacement warhead is not needed until 2019. The UK is participating in the US life extension programme for the Trident D5 missile, which will extend its life until the 2040s. So the main gate decision due next year is only about replacing the four submarines, while keeping the existing warheads and missiles.
A Strategic Defence and Security Review carried out in 2010 made several recommendations on the direction of the Successor programme, mainly to reduce costs. The basis for those changes was a conclusion that minimum effective deterrence could be achieved with a smaller nuclear weapons capability than that now in operation. Thus, the new submarine platform, should it get the go-ahead, will be configured with eight operational missile tubes, instead of the originally planned 12. Each boat will also carry fewer warheads than the current Vanguard fleet.
HMS Victorious leaves Faslane for a refit at Devonport. Such refits are more manageable under a four-boat system
Contracts placed
Around 2,200 people across the Ministry of Defence and industry are working on the Successor programme, of whom 50% are designers and engineers. Approval of the ‘initial gate’ stage was announced in 2011, so multimillion-pound work packages, including the procurement of long-lead items, have already taken place. Indeed, the government has spent almost £750 million on contracts, the biggest single order being a £328 million deal awarded to BAE Systems for the overall design of the submarine. Babcock, meanwhile, has won work on the in-service support package, while Rolls-Royce has been studying the integration of the reactor design.
According to the House of Commons Library update, published in January this year, it was decided at initial gate to take forward several systems from the Astute-class submarine to be incorporated into the design of the Successor submarine, although it has not been specified exactly what those systems are. The ‘pull through’ of technology is expected to reduce both costs and design and delivery risk for the new platform, while also ensuring commonality in the training and maintenance, the report says.
To take advantage of technological developments since the Astute was originally designed, the Successor submarine will incorporate a new nuclear propulsion design, while also ensuring sufficient flexibility in the overall design to incorporate through-life upgrades. The pressurised water reactor 3 (PWR3) chosen as the propulsion system is considered easier to operate than the current PWR2 system, has a longer in-service life, will require less time in upkeep and maintenance, and has lower through-life maintenance costs because of its longer service life. Work with the US on a common missile compartment is ongoing to evaluate how best to incorporate the UK’s requirement for eight operational missiles.
Design maturity of around 70% needs to be achieved by the end of the assessment phase, so manufacture can commence after main gate without the need for redesign, which would introduce delays and increased costs. The aim is to incorporate into the design, at an acceptable level of risk, several components in which technological improvements have been planned, including communications, tactical weapon systems, batteries and structural materials. Around £8 million has been spent to study the requirement for investment in the UK’s nuclear deterrent infrastructure.
The initial gate business case outlined several ‘long lead’ items that would be procured as part of the next phase of work, including the steel for the hull of the first submarine. Further orders before main gate are expected to include additional PWR3 components; main lubrication oil pumps; main feed flexible couplings; main shaft bearing; hull fittings; pressure plate and stiffeners; turbo generators; main engines and condensers; and electrical distribution components, the report says.
So is it sensible to spend up to £1 billion before main gate has been confirmed? Chalmers argues that it is. “It’s established best practice to spend up to 15% of the total build cost before deciding to go ahead with production. There’s been a lot of work on design integration, development and testing, so by the time you get to main gate the design is mature and you have a good idea of what the final costs are going to be. If main gate is decided, then the volume of spending will grow sharply,” he says.
But despite a large sum of money already having been spent, it is by no means guaranteed that the Successor programme will continue to progress in its current guise. Political issues are still set to play a part. The Conservative and Labour parties both broadly support a four-boat replacement for the Vanguard fleet. But the Lib Dems have been promoting a cost-cutting alternative, having pushed through an in-depth look at alternatives to a submarine-based deterrent and assessing whether there was a submarine-based alternative to the current proposal, such as a modified Astute-class submarine using cruise missiles. The Trident Alternatives Review, published last year, looked at several specific systems and technologies, which might underpin future procurement decisions. These alternatives included nuclear-tipped cruise missiles deployed onboard a submarine, surface ship or aircraft, possibly in a dual-purpose role; and air-launched free-fall nuclear bombs deployed onboard a fast jet fleet.
The submarine options considered, in addition to the current SSBN, were a nuclear-armed hunter-killer submarine (SSN), based on either a modified Astute or a new design, or a variant of the current SSBN that could fire either cruise or ballistic missiles. The review also looked at the potential for silo-based missiles, although this option was quickly discounted.
On alternative platforms and systems, the review found that submarines were the least vulnerable maritime cruise missile option, although they would be vulnerable to attack upon missile launch as they would need to operate relatively near an adversary’s territory. Aircraft deployed with cruise missiles would also be vulnerable to attack before launch if an adversary retained the ability to target their location – either onboard a carrier or at an airbase. The review said some states already have this capability, while others may develop it as ballistic missile technologies and satellite-targeting systems proliferate.
Cruise missiles have additional potential constraints, the review said. Their limited range means there might be geographic areas that the UK, if it were acting alone, could not reach. If forward basing were required, it could require third-party agreement, thereby placing uncertainty over the UK’s sovereign ability to use its deterrent. Missile defence capabilities are also likely to improve and proliferate. The report concluded that “maintaining the same level of assurance that the UK deterrent can overcome an adversary’s defences is therefore likely to be harder with a cruise missile-based system”.
The critical challenge would be designing and developing a warhead that could be integrated into a cruise missile or free-fall bomb. Moving to an alternative to the current Trident missile would add technical, financial and schedule risk. It was considered that delivery of a warhead capability integrated into a cruise missile could not be delivered, without risk, for around 24 years, taking us to the year 2040. To bridge the gap between the out-of-service date for the current Vanguard-class SSBN and delivery of an alternative cruise missile-based system, the UK would need to procure a small capability – a two-boat fleet – based on the current SSBN.
BAE Systems won a design contract for the Successor (artist’s impression)
Cost estimates for the development, procurement and in-service support of a new system – platforms, missiles, warheads and any requisite infrastructure – as well as the procurement of a ‘gap’ capability, compared with an SSBN fleet of either three or four boats, were considerably higher. The cost driver for all non-Trident based options was identified as the development of a new warhead and the need to provide a two-boat SSBN fleet to fill the gap between capabilities. “It is the need for these two successor SSBNs that makes the cost of the alternatives more expensive overall than a three- or four-boat successor SSBN fleet,” said the report.
It also noted that all alternative options would require the UK to order additional conventional submarines, to avoid the loss of sovereign submarine manufacturing capability in the future. A dual-capable submarine fleet would be more expensive, as a larger fleet would be required to perform the equivalent conventional and deterrent tasks. The review concluded that a fleet of between 10 and 18 SSNs would be required, as opposed to the current fleet of four SSBNs and seven SSNs.
The Lib Dems were keen to see the Trident Alternatives Review carried out because of their position in government, says Chalmers. But he adds: “It all depends on what you want from your deterrent; how powerful you want it to be; and who you want to deter. The current system, and Successor, is designed to deter the most difficult, powerful states, such as Russia and China. Some of the other options – the missiles, the free-fall bombs – have a much more limited range and there’s a discussion about whether they will be able to penetrate air defences in 10, 20 or 30 years’ time.
“An aircraft system would not be credible against major powers unless you had an expensive long-range bomber. The F35s on our carriers could be fitted with weapons, and if you parked them off the coast of a country with limited air defences, then you could attack it with nuclear weapons. But if you were talking about a country with sophisticated air defences, where you can’t get near to the coast, then you couldn’t use our aircraft carriers. The F35s just wouldn’t have the range. That’s one of the reasons why some of the alternatives would be rejected,” he says.
Another, more practical, reason for which some alternatives would be discounted is cost. The Successor programme is about the replacement of the Vanguard fleet while use of the existing warhead and missile continues. If a new government were to go for a non-submarine option, it would require a new missile and warhead. That would add to the design and development outlay.
Furthermore, the UK and the US have forged close links when it comes to missile and warhead design. Indeed, some of the non-nuclear components in the British warhead are bought from the US. But the nuclear component – the fissile material – is British. “There is a lot of commonality between UK/US warhead design,” says Chalmers. “That’s one of the reasons it makes sense for the UK not to start the process of getting a new warhead until the US decides to move forward, too. If we get out of lock-step on warhead design and have to build a lot of these components ourselves, it would be expensive.”
If, after the election, Successor is agreed as the way forward, discussions will begin in earnest on the number of boats required. That decision will be made at main gate. It is widely thought that to provide CASD, four submarines will need to be built. But if the 2015 general election results in a Labour-Lib Dem coalition, a desire to hammer down the costs of Successor could see three boats emerging as a serious option. That creates a potential CASD problem, says Chalmers. “With three boats, sometimes the vessels have to go in for a longer refit, where they can’t immediately be mobilised. So there’s a question about whether you can do the proper preparation of the boat that’s in port while the other one is out at sea. The margins of error are small. You could probably maintain CASD with two, plus one in dock, but it would be touch and go. Four gives a much higher degree of assurance.”
Chalmers thinks that a decision on the fourth boat might be put off until a later date. But such a delay would bring contractual concerns between the government and BAE Systems into play. “You can imagine all sorts of conversations being played out. This is a monopoly supplier, of course,” he says.